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THE BEGINNING OF THE END: 
IMPLICATIONS OF VIOLATING USERRA 
 
Jessica Vasil 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Every year, more than a thousand National Guard, reserve and active-duty troops coming back 
from Iraq, Afghanistan or other military duties complain of being denied jobs or otherwise being 
penalized by employers because of their military obligations. The biggest offender: the federal 
government.”1 In fiscal year 2011, “More than 18 percent of the 1,548 complaints of violations 
of [the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act] involved federal 
agencies, according to figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.” 2  These 
violations are not exclusive to federal agencies; some are privately owned companies.3  
 
Kevin Ziober was a member of the United States Navy Reserve.4 His full-time civilian employer 
was BLB Resources, Inc., a real estate marketing and managing firm. 5  Approximately six 
months after he was hired, Mr. Zoiber signed a bilateral arbitration agreement.6 After that, Mr. 
Zoiber was called to serve his country in a deployment to Afghanistan.7 Mr. Zoiber provided 
notice to his employer that he would be taking leave to serve his country; on his last day with the 
company, he was told he would not have a job at BLB Resources, Inc. after he returned from his 
deployment.8  
 
In April 2014, after returning from Afghanistan, Mr. Zoiber sued his former employer for 
“violating USERRA's provisions protecting service members against discrimination and 
establishing reemployment rights.” 9  The employer moved to have the arbitration agreement 
enforced, and the district court obliged.10 Mr. Zoiber appealed, claiming that the “plain text and 
history of USERRA [Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act] reveal 
that Congress intended to preclude the compelled arbitration of claims arising under its 
provisions.”11 
 
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) has 
three stated purposes: (1) to encourage service in the National Guard and Reserve by minimizing 
                                                 
1 Steve Vogel, Returning Military Members Allege Job Discrimination-by Federal Government, WASH. POST, Feb. 
19 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/returning-military-members-allege-job-
discrimination--by-federal-government/2012/01/31/gIQAXvYvNR_story.html.  
2 Id. 
3 See Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. Cal. 2016). 
4 Id. at 815-816.  
5 Id. at 816.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 817.  
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the disruption to service member’s civilian employment due to military service; (2) to minimize 
disruption to the service member’s employers, family, community and coworkers by providing 
for prompt reemployment upon return; and (3) to prohibit discrimination in employment and 
reemployment against National Guard and Reserve members due to their military service.12 
Section 4302 of USERRA speaks of USERRA’s relation to other law and plans or agreements: 
 
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or diminish any Federal or 
State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, 
plan, practice, or other matter that establishes a right or benefit that is more 
beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit provided for such person in this 
chapter. (b) This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or 
ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that 
reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this 
chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of 
any such right or the receipt of any such benefit.13 
 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was first enacted in 1925. It codifies the federal policy of 
enforcing arbitration agreements.14 The FAA’s “primary purpose . . . was to make arbitration 
agreements enforceable in federal court.” 15 This article will address how these two federal 
statutes are incompatible, as well as the negative implications of violating USERRA.   
 
This article will address the history, background, and purpose of USERRA, as well as the 
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). These two federal statutes are in 
conflict when employers contractually obligate their service members to arbitration in violation 
of their USERRA rights. Specifically, USERRA’s non-waiver provision and the FAA are 
incompatible. The Eleventh Circuit Court in Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control addressed this issue 
head on. 16 This article’s position is that the dissent in Bodine applied the proper legal analysis.  
 
Next, this article will review the legislative histories of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). USERRA’s anti-
discrimination provisions are similar to the EEOC legislation and lends itself to a comparison. 
Finally, this article will discuss the negative implications of violating USERRA and the proposed 
changes in order to negate these issues. 
 
  
                                                 
12 38 U.S.C., § 4301 (2012). 
13 38 U.S.C. § 4302 (2012). 
14 Asa Lopatin, What Constitutes Arbitration for Federal Arbitration Act Purposes?, ABA: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (June 16, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles/spring2014-0614-
federal-arbitration-act.html.  
15Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 106 (2002). 
16 Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016).  
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
This section will review both USERRA and the FAA. The history of USERRA will be discussed, 
including the purpose of USERRA and how the statute operates. Then, an in-depth analysis of 
the legislative history of the FAA will be discussed. 
 
A. USERRA 
 
Protecting civilian employment started with the Selective Service Training Act of 1940 
(“SSTA”). The SSTA was amended over 25 times and the Supreme Court has interpreted it in 18 
cases – yet SSTA’s fundamental premise has remained constant: protect our national security 
and ensure that people who serve are not disadvantaged by serving.16 With every major conflict, 
the SSTA has been changed.17  Further, after the first Gulf War, the SSTA was completely 
revamped with the passage of new legislation — USERRA.18 USERRA was passed in response 
to reports of firings, layoffs, and other adverse employment actions taken against deployed 
National Guard and Reserve component members from the first Gulf War.19 USERRA is the 
most comprehensive legislation yet aimed at protecting citizen-soldiers, and it is more effective 
in this regard than any of its predecessors.20 USERRA expanded upon previous laws to provide 
anti-discrimination protection, reemployment rights, and protections for National Guard and 
Reserve members.21  
 
Regulations provided by USERRA are fundamental to ensure the protection of citizen-soldiers.22 
Historically, the military has relied on citizen-soldiers to supplement the active-duty troops to 
ensure that the U.S. military is appropriately armed.23 Today, every branch of the military has a 
Reserve component.24 The purpose of each Reserve component is to “provide trained units and 
qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national 
emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the 
armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” 
25 As part of the Reserve component, the National Guard performs a unique role in military 
readiness-states forces that can also be called to federal military service. 26  The Reserve 
component members include Air and Army National Guard and reserves from each of the five 
branches of the armed forces; these individuals are part time civilians, part time soldiers.27 These 
                                                 
16 THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES (2013).  
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 BRIAN CLAUSS & STACEY RAE SIMCOX, SERVICEMEMBER AND VETERANS RIGHTS, (Lexis Nexis 2014). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 257 (2013). 
23 David Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, Population Reference Bureau, U.S. Military’s Reliance on the Reserves, 
(March 2005), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/USMilitarysRelianceontheReserves.aspx.   
24 National Center for PTSD, Active Duty vs. Reserve or National Guard, Apr. 6, 2012, http://www.va.gov/vets 
inworkplace/docs/em_activeReserve.html.  
25 10 U.S.C § 10102 (2004). 
26 THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 257 (2013). 
27 David Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, Population Reference Bureau, U.S. Military’s Reliance on the Reserves, 
(March 2005), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/USMilitarysRelianceonthe Reserves.aspx. 
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reserve forces are critical to the military’s total forces.”28 While the National Guard and Reserve 
components have historically been criticized for being “part-time, volunteers who are poorly 
trained, poorly funded and under equipped,”29 the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st 
centuries saw the National Guard become an operational reserve, and both the National Guard 
and the Reserve components have been deployed in record numbers.30 The Reserve components 
are a critical aspect of national security.31 “Whether  flying   supply   and   logistics   support   
missions,   acting   as  the  federal  government’s  first  response  force  at  home,  or  supporting  
active-duty  forces  during  combat  engagements  overseas,  these  components  have  enabled  
and  enhanced  the  U.S. Military’s overall capabilities and capacities.” 32 Hundreds of thousands 
of National Guard and Reserve component members have been activated since 9/11.33  
 
Studies have found a correlation between mental health issues, the number of times deployed, 
and the length of time deployed in war zones. 34  National Guard and Reserve component 
members returning from deployment experience mental health issues at a rate more than 50% 
higher than their active duty counterparts.35 Although suicide rates among active duty members 
have lessened, those rates have increased among National Guard and Reserve component 
members.36 
 
Both the National Guard and the Reserves are critical operational reserves and will continue to 
be used by the Department of Defense.37 General Jack Stultz, former Chief of the Army Reserve, 
testified to Congress that the Army “has to have an operational reserve[s][.] Just in raw numbers, 
75 percent of your engineering capabilities[,] 80 percent of your logistics capability[,] 75 percent 
of your medical capability[,] 85 percent of your civil affairs capability, which is in high demand, 
is in the reserve or the Guard.” 38 General Harry Wyatt, former Director of the Air National 
                                                 
28 Patty Ritchie, Military Reserves Critical to Our Nation’s Defense (June 27, 2011), https://www.nysenate.gov/ 
newsroom/articles/patty-ritchie/military-reserves-critical-our-nations-defense.   
29 Brain Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment Providing Healthcare to the Citizen Soldier in the National Guard 
and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 917 (2015). 
30 Id. at 927;  See Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists’ Reemployment Rights, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 797, 801 (2004). 
31 Col. Richard J. Dunn III, America’s Reserve and National Guard Components: Key Contributors to U.S. Military 
Strength, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2016). 
32 Id. 
33 See Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price 
for National Defense?, 59 A.F.L. REV. 287, 289 (2007) (discussing that from September 11, 2001, to 2007, 
“approximately 517,000 Reserve component members of the United States military ha[d] been mobilized in support 
of Operations Noble Easle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom”). 
34 Olumpia Duhart, Soldiers Suicides and Outcrit Jurisprudence: An Anti-Subordination Analysis, 44 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 883, 889-91 (2011).  
35  Lauren Everitt et al., Efforts Lag to Improve Care for National Guard, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2012, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/efforts-lag-to-improve-care-for-national-
guard/2012/02/04/gIQAymEWER_story.html?utm_term=.ad0574ed1ab3.  
36 Id. 
37 John A. Nagl & Travis Sharp, Operational for What' The Future of the Guard and Reserves, Sept. 28, 2010, 
https://www.army.mil/article/45819/operational_for_what_the_future_of_the_guard_and_reserves (last visited 16 
Nov 17) 
38Sgt. John Orrell, Nat. Guard Bureau, Guard Leaders or House Subcommittee: National Guard should Remain 
Operational Reserve, (Apr. 7, 2011),  http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/ArticleView/Article/60128 9/guard-
leaders-to-house-subcommittee-national-guard-should-remain-operational-re/. 
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Guard, also testified, “The Air National Guard provides about 34 percent of the total capability 
of the Air Force on about 7 percent of the budget . . . That’s probably the most cost-effective arm 
of the Air Force that we have.” 39 With the current political climate focused on cutting the 
defense budget, the Guard and Reserve components will allow for a lower defense budget, 
without limiting the capability of our armed forces.40 With the increase role of the citizen-soldier 
in operational readiness, the role of USERRA cannot be overstated.41  
 
Unlike other employment laws that are “justified under the commerce clause, USERRA was 
enacted pursuant to the War Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”42 It also distinguishes the 
federal government because of its special role in employing citizen-soldiers.43 38 U.S.C. Section 
4302(b) states “the sense of Congress that the Federal Government should be a model employer 
in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.”44  
 
USERRA accomplishes these purposes by providing protection in two ways: (1) anti-
discrimination; (2) and reemployment rights.45 The anti-discrimination provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
4311prohibit discrimination in employment based on prior military service or obligations.46 The 
reemployment provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 4312 address the return-to-work rights of service 
members who performed military service in the National Guard and Reserve component.47  
 
USERRA covers virtually all U.S. employers, including private employers, regardless of size, as 
well as federal, state, and municipal governments, for-profit, non-profits, and general contractors 
and their sub-contractors.48 The anti-discrimination protection applies to “any person employed 
by an employer: who voluntarily or involuntarily ‘is a member of, applies to be a member of, 
performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a 
uniformed service.’”49 However, USERRA does not supersede any law, regulation, or collective 
bargaining agreement that provides for greater rights than those granted by USERRA. 50 
Conversely, USERRA does supersede any state statute, regulation, or collective bargaining 
agreement that restricts USERRA rights or places additional requirements upon the service 
                                                 
39 Id.  
40 John A. Nagl & Travis Sharp, Operational for What' The Future of the Guard and Reserves, Sept. 28, 2010, 
https://www.army.mil/article/45819/operational_for_what_the_future_of_the_guard_and_reserves. 
41 Charles Lathrop, The Army's Unsung Heroes: Full-Time Support to the Army National Guard, Association of the 
US Army (July 3, 2000), https://www.ausa.org/publications/army%E2%80%99s-unsung-heroes-full-time-support-
army-national-guard-and-army-reserve.   
42See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl 11.   
43 Id. 
44 38 U.S.C. § 4301(b) (2000). 
45 38 U.S.C. § 4311-4312 (2012). 
46 Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., 411 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005). 
47 Leib v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 925 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1991). 
48 38 U.S.C § 4303(4) (2012). There are certain exemptions for certain federal agencies that work on national 
defense. See 20 C.F.R. §1002.34 (2006). 
49 38 U.S.C. § 4303(3) (2012). 
50 38 U.S.C. § 4302(a) (2012). 
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member.51  In addition to the widespread protection provided, enforcing those rights also comes 
with no statute of limitations for USERRA claims.52 
 
USERRA prevents employment discrimination against an individual based on service in the 
Reserve or Guard.53 Section 4311 states, in pertinent part, that: 
 
(a) A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has 
performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a 
uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, 
retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an 
employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership, 
performance of service, application for service, or obligation.54 
 
In essence, this means that an individual is qualified under this statute if s/he is a member of the 
armed forces.55 Said individual cannot be denied employment, promotions, or any benefit of 
employment due to their service:56 
 
(b) An employer may not discriminate in employment against or take any adverse 
employment action against any person because such person (1) has taken an 
action to enforce a protection afforded any person under this chapter, (2) has 
testified or otherwise made a statement in or in connection with any 
proceeding under this chapter, (3) has assisted or otherwise participated in an 
investigation under this chapter, or (4) has exercised a right provided for in 
this chapter.57 
 
This section means that an employer cannot discriminate against an individual if said individual 
takes any action to enforce their rights under this statute.58 Under USERRA, an employer is 
defined as “any person, institution or organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages for 
work performed or that has control over employment opportunities.” 59 The broad definition also 
includes any entity that has been “delegated the performance of employment-related 
responsibilities” such as a successor in interest, regardless of whether the successor knew of the 
possible USERRA claim at the time of the merger or acquisition. 60  This also includes 
government contractors61 and union hiring halls.62 Section (c)(1) of USERRA provides that  
 
                                                 
51 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012). 
52 38 U.S.C. § 4327(d) (2012). 
53  THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 258 (2013). 
54 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2002). 
55 See Montoya v. Orange County Sheriff's Dep't, 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
56 Id. 
57 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) (2002). 
58 See Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir. Va. 2006). 
59 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(a) (2002). 
60 20 C.F.R. §1002.36 (2006).  
61  20 C.F.R. §1002.37 (2006). 
62 20 C.F.R. §1002.38 (2006). 
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(c) An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited - 
(1) under subsection (a), if the person's membership, application for membership, 
service, application for service, or obligation for service in the uniformed services 
is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that 
the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership, application 
for membership, service, application for service, or obligation for service; or63 
 
Section (c), subsection (1) means that an employer cannot use an individual’s service in the 
armed forces as a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to fire an individual.64 The only 
exception to this is if the employer can prove that, regardless of the individual’s service, the 
same action would have occurred:65 Section (c)(2) states that  
 
if the person's (A) action to enforce a protection afforded any person under this 
chapter, (B) testimony or making of a statement in or in connection with any 
proceeding under this chapter, (C) assistance or other participation in an 
investigation under this chapter, or (D) exercise of a right provided for in this 
chapter, is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can 
prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such person's 
enforcement action, testimony, statement, assistance, participation, or exercise of 
a right.66 
 
Section (c), subsection (2) means that if an individual in the Armed Forces takes any action to 
utilize this statute, the employer cannot use it as a motivating factor in the employer’s action 
unless the employer can prove that this action would have been taken regardless.67  
 
An employer cannot discriminate in initial employment, reemployment after service, retention in 
employment, promotion or any benefit of work.68 Section 4311(c) was enacted in response to the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co. 69  Monroe held that “38 U.S.C.S. § 
2021(b)(3) did not require an employer to provide preferential scheduling of work hours for an 
employee who was absent from work to fulfill his military reserve obligations.”70 USERRA 
“liberalized this requirement by providing that a violation could be established if the individual's 
military service was a ‘motivating factor’ in the discriminatory action, even if it was not the only 
factor.” 71  In 2011, USERRA was amended to include protection against hostile work 
                                                 
63 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2002). 
64 See Montoya, 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
65 See. Id. 
66 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2002). 
67 See Francis, 452 F.3d at 302. 
68 THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 258 (2013). 
69 Monroe, 452 U.S. at 559 (held that under the VRRA, allegations of discrimination in employment based upon 
military service could be proven only if the employee could establish that the discrimination was motivated solely 
by reserve status). 
70 Monroe, 452 U.S. at 551. 
71 Sheehan v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Woodard v. N.Y. Health & Hosps. Corp., 
554 F. Supp. 2d 329, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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environments on the basis of military status.72 The phrase Congress added––"terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment"––directly mirrors the language under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.73 In 1986, the Supreme Court found that “this language permitted a plaintiff to 
assert a hostile work environment claim in a Title VII case.”74 Because Congress is “presumed to 
understand the legal import of words it uses in light of existing case law,” the Court found that, 
“by adding this particular phrase Congress intended to ensure that plaintiffs are able to bring 
hostile work environment claims under USERRA.”75 
 
Further, an employer is prohibited from retaliating against a member of the armed services for 
bringing enforcement action under the USERRA.76 Otherwise stated, an employee cannot be 
subjected to an adverse employment action because the employee acted to bring a claim for 
USERRA protection, has assisted an investigation of a USERRA matter, or exercised a 
USERRA right.77 USERRA “requires the complaining soldier or veteran to demonstrate only 
that his or her military service was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.”78 
(emphasis added.) Once the plaintiff has discharged his initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to “the employer . . . to come forward with 
evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer would have taken the 
adverse action anyway, for a valid reason.” 79  This means that an employee who makes a 
discrimination claim under USERRA bears the initial burden of showing, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that his military service was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 
employment action.80 If the employee makes that prima facie showing, the employer can avoid 
liability by demonstrating, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action 
without regard to the employee's military service. 81 Therefore, an employer violates Section 
4311 if it would not have taken the adverse employment action but for the employee's military 
service or obligation.82  
 
  
                                                 
72 Veterans’ Benefit Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 112-56, § 251. 
73 See Montoya v. Orange County Sheriff's Dep't, 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2013); see 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2 (1991) (stating that it is unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).   
74 Montoya, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-12; see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("[T]he 
phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment in Title VII is an expansive concept which sweeps within its 
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial 
discrimination.").  
75 Montoya, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.  
76 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012). 
77 Escher v. BWXT Y-12, 627 F.3d 1020 (6th Cir. 2010). 
78 See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2012); Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry., 571 F.3d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2009). 
79 Sheehan v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
80 Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 571 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
81 Erickson, 571 F.3d at 1368; Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines Of Puerto Rico, Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 
2007). 
82 See Erickson, 571 F.3d at 1368 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 24 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 
2457). 
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B. FAA 
 
Arbitration is a “creature of contract between parties who have willingly agreed to resolve their 
disputes outside the courts. It is encouraged by the legal system as a fast, cheap, and informal 
alternative to litigation.”83 In enacting § 2 of the FAA, Congress declared a “national policy 
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the 
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”84 The FAA 
provides: 
 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.85 
 
Congress enacted the FAA, which was then called the Unites States Arbitration Act, in 1925.86 
The Act was a result of years of drafting and lobbying by business groups and the ABA.87 The 
ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law “prepared the original draft of the 
bill, and Congress enacted it into law with only minor amendments.”88 At the time the FAA was 
enacted, Swift v. Tyson, which held that federal diversity actions were free to ignore the common 
law of the state that resulted in forum shopping, was still good law.89 At this point in time, “rules 
governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements were seen as procedural, not substantive, 
and so were governed by the law of the forum.”90 It wasn’t until after the Supreme Court’s 1956 
decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., that the Court recognized the enforceability of 
agreements to arbitrate as a substantive matter to be governed by state law in federal diversity 
cases that go beyond the scope of the FAA.91  
 
The primary purpose of the FAA was to “make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal 
courts.”92 Congress intended “more comprehensive objectives” than adopting rules applicable 
only in federal court: “The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for 
                                                 
83 Aaron Bayer, Arbitration Appeals, NAT’L L. J. (June 28, 2004), http://www.wiggin.com/4801; see e.g. Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985). 
84 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (U.S. 1984). 
85 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015). 
86 Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 125 (2002). 
87 3 Ian R. Macneil et al., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, & REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL 
ACT, 84-101 (1994).  
88 Id. at 84-91.  
89 Swift v. Tyson,41 U.S. 1 (1842).  
90 Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 126 (2002). 
91 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1956).  
92Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105 (2002). 
9
Vasil: The Beginning of the End: Implications of Violating USERRA
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2018
VASIL: THE BEGINNING OF THE END 10 
arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or 
admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the federal courts.”93 The “principle 
purpose” of the FAA was to “require courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to 
arbitration, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.”94 Form contracts, otherwise 
known as “contracts of adhesion,” consist of one party who offers terms on a non-negotiated, 
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis.95 These contracts are contrary to the intended purpose of the FAA.96 
In fact, the legislative history of the FAA reveals that Congress intended it to target commercial 
parties of generally comparable bargaining power rather than consumers or, by extension, 
investors.97 As Representative William Graham noted in the debate on the House floor in 1924, 
“This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an 
agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts — an agreement to arbitrate, when 
voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it.” 98  Legislative history reveals that 
Congress intended the FAA to cover disputes between merchants of approximately equal 
strength 99 but not those involving disputes with workers 100 or disputes where the arbitration 
agreement could be considered an adhesion contract.101 
 
To the detriment of the consumer, the Supreme Court has expanded the reach of the FAA over 
the past 20 years to apply in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power.102  Congress 
discussed this expansion during their 2009-2010 session.103 
 
Although arbitration was initially conceived as a privately-run, voluntary process 
for resolving disputes, mainly between businesses, written and oral testimony 
from Congressional hearings during the 110th Congress indicated that the use of 
arbitration had expanded in the last twenty years. Many businesses are now 
requiring arbitration of disputes in their consumer, employment, and franchise 
relationships. Ironically, during the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
Congress did not intend to allow binding arbitration agreements on individuals if 
                                                 
93 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984). 
94 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior U., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).   
95 The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights of 
Consumers, Workers, and Small Businesses?: Hearing on S. 878 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (statement of Mike Rothman, Comm’r Minn. Dep’t Com.), http://www.nasaa.org/28459/federal-
arbitration-act-access-justice-will-recent-supreme-court-decisions-undermine-rights-consumers-workers-small-
businesses/. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 68 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924). 
99  Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of 
Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10 (1924). 
100 Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing 
on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9, 14 (1923). 
101 H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 128. (1924).  
102 The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights 
of Consumers, Workers, and Small Businesses?: Hearing on S. 878 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (statement of Mike Rothman, Comm’r Minn. Dep’t Com.), http://www.nasaa.org/28459/federal-
arbitration-act-access-justice-will-recent-supreme-court-decisions-undermine-rights-consumers-workers-small-
businesses/. 
103 H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 126. 
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the contracts were between parties of unequal bargaining power. The secret nature 
of arbitration, the ability of the drafter to dictate the terms of the arbitration 
process, and the apparent loss of civil protections when compared to a court 
proceeding have created controversy among consumer and employee advocates 
and small business owners.104 
 
Because arbitration “avoids the public court system in favor of a private industry of arbitration 
groups, individuals lose some of the benefits and rights associated with traditional litigation.”105 
These benefits and rights include “lower initial financial hurdles, pretrial discovery, formal civil 
procedure rules, proximity to the resolution forum, access to counsel, class action options, and 
fairness.” 106  Arbitration clauses may even “negate the protection of some federal statutes. 
Several recent developments necessitated the [Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative 
Law] to hold hearings generally on arbitration.” 107 While there is a clear federal policy favoring 
arbitration,108 the original intent of the FAA and how it is currently being enforced are at odds.  
 
III. ISSUE 
 
This section of the article will discuss how USERRA and the FAA are incompatible. In 
particular, USERRA’s non-waiver provision is incompatible as applied to arbitration agreements 
with USERRA offending terms. The article will then discuss the Bodine case, which is a 
particularly applicable case in regards to this issue. 113 This article contends that the dissent in the 
Bodine case was correct in its analysis. 
 
Next, the article will examine Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC, paying 
particular attention to the statute’s legislative history. USERRA is often analyzed through the 
employment law lens used in EEOC cases. Therefore, USERRA and the EEOC lend themselves 
to comparison. 
 
A. USERRA’s Non Waiver Provision and the FAA are Incompatible as Applied to Arbitration 
Agreements with USERRA Offending Terms. 
 
USERRA was drafted to supersede any contracts that reduce, limit, or eliminate any rights under 
USERRA.109 The statute specifically “supersedes any State law . . . , contract, agreement, policy, 
plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or 
benefit provided by this chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the 
exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit.” 110Arbitration agreements are 
contracts, and the FAA placed “arbitration agreements on an even footing with all other 
                                                 
104 Id. at 55-56. 
105Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
113 Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016). 
109 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2015). 
110 Id. 
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contracts.”111 Accordingly, USERRA “supersedes any arbitration agreements that abrogate in 
any manner the rights provided by the USERRA as described in the text of the statute.”112 The 
Supreme Court has held that by entering into an arbitration agreement “covering statutory 
claims, a party does not relinquish his or her substantive rights provided by the statute. Instead, 
the party simply submits the determination of those rights to an arbitral rather than a judicial 
forum.”113  
 
The House Report on Section 4302(a) of the USERRA states that Section 4302(b) would 
“reaffirm a general preemption as to State and local laws and ordinances, as well as to employer 
practices and agreements, which provide fewer rights or otherwise limit rights provided under 
amended chapter 43 or put additional conditions on those rights.”114 Furthermore, this section 
would reaffirm that utilizing tools such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar 
administrative appeals is not required.115 It is the “Committee's intent that, even if a person 
protected under the Act resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision shall not be binding as a 
matter of law.”116 The Committee further stressed that rights under chapter 43 “belong to the 
claimant, and he or she may waive those rights, either explicitly or impliedly, through conduct. 
Because of the remedial purposes of chapter 43, any waiver must, however, be clear, convincing, 
specific, unequivocal, and not under duress.”117 Additionally, “Only known rights which are 
already in existence may be waived. An express waiver of future statutory rights, such as one 
that an employer might wish to require as a condition of employment, would be contrary to the 
public policy embodied in the Committee bill and would be void.”118 Thus, the Congressional 
intent behind “the USERRA is clear: Section 4302(b) was intended to preempt employer-
employee agreements that limit rights provided under the USERRA or put additional conditions 
on those rights.”119  
 
The House Report demonstrates Congress’s intent that an “arbitration decision would not be 
binding in this situation, even if a person covered by the USERRA resorted to arbitration.”120 
Specifically, that subsection supersedes any agreement that imposes additional “prerequisites to 
the exercise of any . . . right or the receipt of any . . . benefit” provided by the act.121 Thus, given 
the language of Section 4302(b) and the legislative history of USERRA, the Supreme Court has 
held that USERRA grants those “covered by it the right to pursue their claims in a judicial forum 
and that the USERRA preempts arbitration agreements purportedly covering claims arising 
under the USERRA.”122  
 
                                                 
111 Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003). 
112 Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
113 Id. at 1336; see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
114 H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1994), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2453. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1994), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2453. 
119 Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
120 Id.  
121 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (1994). 
122 Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.  
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B. A Case Study—The Bodine Case 
 
In Bodine, Plaintiff-Appellant Rodney Bodine was an employee of Defendant-Appellee Cook’s 
Pest Control from 2012 to 2014, during “which time he also served in the United States Army 
Reserve.”129 Bodine’s “commitment to the armed forces required him to periodically take leave 
from work to attend drills and training.” 123  Bodine alleged that his supervisor, Max Fant, 
“repeatedly discriminated against him on the basis of his military service by making negative 
comments about his military obligations, encouraging him to leave the Army Reserve, taking 
work away from him while he was at drills and training, and eventually firing him in retaliation 
for continued military service.” 124 The case required the Court to “interpret the non-waiver 
provision of USERRA as it relates to the FAA and enforcement of an arbitration agreement with 
terms purportedly in conflict with USERRA.”125  
 
Bodine argued that the arbitration agreement was “unenforceable because the arbitration 
agreement itself contained two terms that violated USERRA: (1) the limitation on the 
employee’s arbitration costs, with opportunity for the arbitrator to re-apportion costs and 
attorney’s fees in the arbitrator’s final order (fee term); and (2) the six-month statute of 
limitations (statute of limitations term).”126 USERRA states that there is “no statute of limitations 
for bringing a USERRA claim and no imposition of court costs or fees may be charged to a 
USERRA plaintiff.”127 Cook’s conceded that these two terms “ran afoul of USERRA, but argued 
that the Contract’s severability clause could be used to remove the invalid terms from the 
arbitration agreement while retaining and enforcing the remainder, pursuant to the FAA.”128 
Bodine responded that USERRA’s non-waiver provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b), “precluded 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement, despite the FAA, because the plain language of § 
4302(b) prevents enforcement of any agreement that contains terms that reduce substantive 
USERRA rights, and the fee term and statute of limitations term reduced Bodine’s substantive 
USERRA rights.”129 The district court ruled in favor of Cook’s, severing the violating terms of 
the arbitration agreement while enforcing the remainder pursuant to the FAA.130 However, the 
district court did not address the role or scope of USERRA’s non-waiver provision or its 
relationship to the FAA.131  
 
On appeal, Bodine renewed the same argument, contending that the district court erred by 
“failing to apply the plain language of USERRA’s non-waiver provision.”132 Bodine argued that 
the “arbitration agreement would be unenforceable, as a whole, because the plain language of 
that subsection states that USERRA ‘supersedes’ any ‘agreement’ that ‘limit[s], reduce[s], or 
                                                 
129 Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2016).   
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1322. 
126 Id. at 1323. 
127 Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 4323(H)(l), § 4327(b) (2008). 
128 Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1323.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1323 -1324.  
131 Id. at 1324.  
132 Id.  
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eliminate[s]’ any rights protected under USERRA, and the arbitration agreement contains 
USERRA-offensive terms.”133 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the “[c]ontract’s arguable delegation clause –– which would require that the arbitrator, rather 
than the court, determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable –– does not control 
this appeal.”134 In determining whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable, The Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that “§ 4302(b) is not in conflict with the FAA and the district court properly 
determined the arbitration agreement is enforceable.”135  
 
This article’s position is that the majority was incorrect in its analysis and that the dissent, 
written by Circuit Judge Martin, was correct in its analysis.136 The majority was wrong two 
ways. First, “the majority interpret[ed] 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) in a way that is not consistent with 
the statute’s plain text. Second, the majority [gave] the defendants more than they asked for –– a 
second chance to apply contract terms that admittedly violate USERRA. In both ways, the 
majority weaken[ed] the rights of veterans based on a statute intended to give them strength.”137  
 
The majority interpreted § 4302(b) as “invalidating only the pieces of an agreement that violate 
USERRA, rather than the whole agreement.”138 However, as the dissent points out, when the text 
of the statute is not ambiguous, “[courts] have no call to substitute what [they] think might be a 
more reasonable reading of a statute –– rather, ‘[they] must apply the statute according to its 
terms.’”139  
 
Section 4302(b) reads, “This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or 
ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or 
eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter, including the 
establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any 
such benefit.” 140 In light of its plain language, the dissent argued that the “statute  supersedes 
‘any . . . contract [or] agreement,’ not merely the illegal pieces of a contract or agreement,”141 
and that nowhere “does the statute include the limitation found by the majority.”142 Everything 
listed in §4302(b) (“law . . . , contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice or other matter”) is a 
“whole, not a piece of a larger whole (for example, ‘contract provision’ or ‘term of 
agreement’).143 Despite knowing “how to limit the scope of a non-waiver provision, Congress 
chose not to in USERRA, and [courts] should understand that choice as deliberate.”144 Congress 
plainly said the statute supersedes “contract[s]” and “agreements[s]” that reduce USERRA 
rights.145 
                                                 
133 Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (1994). 
134 Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1324. 
135 Id.  
136 Id.at 1328.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1329 (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)).  
140 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2015). 
141 Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1329.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 1329; see U. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).  
145 Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1329. 
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It would seem that USERRA’s purpose to “vigorously protect veterans” rights would be better 
served by superseding more than just the illegal terms (though not any “more beneficial” terms) 
because doing so deters employer overreaching.” 146 Under the majority’s interpretation of § 
4302(b), “employers will have nothing to lose by including illegal terms in their contracts — 
even if a legally learned veteran does recognize the illegal terms as such (hardly a foregone 
conclusion), the worst that can happen to the employer is delicate removal of only the illegal 
terms.”147 In Bodine, this meant that the defendants were still able to “arbitrate Mr. Bodine's case 
even though they drafted an arbitration agreement that infringed on his USERRA rights. The 
employer suffers no penalty for its bad drafting.”148 Under the majority’s interpretation, “even 
when employers don’t get the unfair benefit of their illegal terms because employees like Mr. 
Bodine recognize the terms’ illegality, USERRA will do nothing to dissuade employers from 
continuing to use those illegal terms in the future. This result surely does not ‘provide the 
greatest benefit to our servicemen and women.’”149  
 
The majority in Bodine further eroded veterans’ rights by giving the defendants more than they 
asked for. 150  The defendants “acknowledge[d] that certain provisions of the arbitration 
agreement violate USERRA.”151 Yet, the majority opinion gave them an “unrequested second 
change to apply these admitted illegal contract terms.”152 This specifically refers to the “fee 
term” and the “statute of limitations term,” both of which explicitly violate USERRA.153 The 
majority opinion “reache[d] out and t[ook] away not just the federal courts’ ability to supersede 
illegal ‘contract[s]’ or ‘agreement[s]’ (as the statute says), but the courts’ ability to supersede 
even the clearly illegal pieces of those contracts.”154  
 
Veterans’ rights statutes “preceding USERRA stretch back to World War II and ‘provide[ ] the 
mechanism for manning the Armed Forces of the United States.’”155 Veterans’ rights statutes 
“thus occupy a domain of special national importance, and our courts should not lightly be 
stripped of the power to enforce them.”156 Under the majority’s decision in Bodine, the “worst to 
happen to overreaching employers will be a delicate removal of just their illegal terms. Veterans, 
on the other hand, may lose their USERRA rights without redress.”157 In the case of a fee term 
like the one found in Bodine, “A veteran might be forced to pay mandatory mediation and 
arbitration fees before she can prove (and if she can prove) to an arbitrator that USERRA has 
                                                 
146 Id. at 1331. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1331-32. 
151 Id. at 1332. 
152 Id. 
153 Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(l) (stating that “no fees or court costs may be charged or taxed against any person 
claiming rights under [USERRA].”); see also 38 U.S.C. § 4327(b) (stating that “inapplicability of statutes of 
limitations. If any person seeks to file a complaint or claim . . . alleging a violation of [USERRA], there shall be no 
limit on the period for filing the complaint of claim.”). 
154 Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1332. 
155 Id. at 1333 (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 583 (1977)). 
156 Id. 
157 Id.  
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been violated.”158 In addition to the majority's “narrow, extra-textual interpretation of § 4302(b), 
its decision to undo the District Court's severance of the clearly illegal terms walks back 
veterans' rights rather than protecting them.” 159 
 
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s in comparison to USERRA. 
 
This section will examine Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (”Title VII”) and the EEOC, 
looking specifically at the legislative history of Title VII. EEOC complaints and USERRA 
violations are analyzed through the same employment lens. The second part of this section will 
compare the two. 
 
i. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC-a legislative history. 
 
Title VII makes it unlawful to “discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, sex or religion. The Act also makes it unlawful to retaliate against a person because the 
person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an 
employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.”160  Title VII “prohibits not only intentional 
discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals 
because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.”161  
 
Under Title VII, it is unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including: “hiring 
and firing; compensation, assignment, or classification of employees; transfer, promotion, layoff, 
or recall; job advertisements and recruitment; testing; use of company facilities; training and 
apprenticeship programs; retirement plans, leave and benefits; or other terms and conditions of 
employment.”162 
 
Title VII is not limited to the above list; there are other “discriminatory practices” that are also 
illegal.163 Those practices include: 
 
harassment on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion; refusal or 
failure to reasonably accommodate an individual’s sincerely held religious 
observances or practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the employer’s business; employment decisions based on stereotypes 
or assumptions about the abilities, traits, or performance of individuals of a 
certain race, color, national origin, sex or religion; and denial of employment 
opportunities to an individual because of marriage to, or association with, an 
individual of a particular race, color, national origin, sex or religion.164  
                                                 
158 Id.  
159 Id. 
160  U.S. DEP’T JUST., Laws Enforced by the Employment Litigation Section, (Aug. 7, 2015) https://www.justice.gov 
/crt/laws-enforced-employment-litgation-section; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (2015). 
161 Id.; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
162 U.S. DEP’T JUST., Laws Enforced by the Employment Litigation Section, (Aug. 7, 2015) https://www.justice.gov 
/crt/laws-enforced-employment-litgation-section; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (2015). 
163 Id.  
164 Id. 
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Complaints under Title VII are filed with the EEOC. Under Title VII, the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) has “authority to prosecute enforcement actions against state and local government 
employers upon referral by the EEOC of complaints arising under the Act.”165 The DOJ also has 
“authority to initiate investigations and prosecute enforcement actions against state and local 
government employers where it has reason to believe that a ‘pattern or practice’ of employment 
discrimination exists.”166 
 
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a 
job applicant or an employee because of the person's race, color, religion, sex (including 
pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability 
or genetic information. It is also illegal to discriminate against a person because the person 
complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an 
employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.167  
 
EEOC’s purpose is to address societal wrongs and to combat discrimination.168 Although the 
EEOC was created by Title VII, its mission “has been shaped by more than this one single piece 
of legislation.”169 In general, the EEOC is “responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it 
illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person's race, color, 
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age 
(40 or older), disability or genetic information.”170 Many laws and amendments, as well as a 
handful of executive orders, have “expanded, limited or directed the Commission's 
responsibilities and authority.”171  
 
In June 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, “prohibiting 
government contractors from engaging in employment discrimination based on race, color or 
national origin.” 172  This is the first presidential action ever taken to “prevent employment 
discrimination by private employers holding government contracts.”173 The order states that it 
applies to “all defense contractors, but contains no enforcement authority.” 174  President 
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 0082 mainly to “ensure that there are no strikes or 
demonstrations disrupting the manufacture of military supplies as the country prepares for 
War.”175 
 
Another example of presidential action to end discrimination occurred in July 1948, when 
President Harry S. Truman ordered the desegregation of the armed forces by Executive Order 
                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Overview, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm. 
168 See PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (U. of Chi. Press 1998).  
169 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, The Law, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/. 
170 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Overview, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/.  
171 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, The Law, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/. 
172 Id.; see Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1938-1943), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/eo-
8802.html.  
173 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, The Law, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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9981.176 The order requires that there be "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in 
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”177 However, U.S. 
armed forces were not actually integrated until the Korean War began in 1952.178 
 
Further, in March 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10925, which 
prohibits “federal government contractors from discriminating on account of race and 
establishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.”179 Departing from 
previous presidential directives, this order grants the Committee, initially chaired by Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, authority to “impose sanctions for violations of the Executive 
Order.”180 President Kennedy stated that enforcement authority provided by the order signaled a 
new “determination to end job discrimination once and for all.”181 
 
Two years later, The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) was passed.182 The EPA was enacted to 
“protect men and women who ‘perform substantially equal work in the same establishment from 
sex-based wage discrimination.’”183 The EPA was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. 184  The EPA is the first national civil rights legislation focusing on employment 
discrimination.185  
The following year, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted.186 It prohibits “discrimination in 
a broad array of private conduct including public accommodations, governmental services and 
education.”187 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also created the EEOC, a “five-member, 
bipartisan commission whose mission is to eliminate unlawful employment discrimination.”188 
Title VII provides that, “Commissioners, no more than three of whom may be from the same 
political party, are appointed to five-year terms by the President and confirmed by the Senate.”189 
The Chairman of the agency “appoints the General Counsel. EEOC is to open its doors for 
business on July 2, 1965 –– one year after Title VII's enactment into law.”190 
  
                                                 
176 Id. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948) (revoked by Exec. Order 11051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9863 
(1962)).  
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (revoked by Exec. Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319).  
180 Id. 
181 Id.  
182 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).  
183 Id. 
184 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963). 
185 Id.  
186 See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  
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ii. EEOC in Comparison to USERRA. 
 
USERRA’s anti-discrimination provisions are similar to those enforced by the EEOC.191 Courts 
tend to follow an employment law analysis in USERRA anti-discrimination cases.192 In Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital, 193 Mr. Staub was a member of the Army Reserves and was employed by 
Proctor Hospital.194 After he was fired by Proctor Hospital, Mr. Staub alleged that the reason he 
was fired was due to his immediate supervisor’s disdain for his military status.195 His supervisor 
claimed that Mr. Staub violated an order, but Mr. Staub claimed that it was made up due to his 
military service.196 At trial, the jury found for Mr. Staub; however, the hospital appealed, arguing 
there was an improper jury instruction on the “cat’s paw” theory of employer liability for 
discrimination.197 An employer “may be liable for discrimination in an adverse employment 
decision against an employee where the ultimate decision maker is unbiased and has no 
discriminatory motives.” 198  Under this theory, the “discriminatory motive of a non-decision 
maker is imputed to the decision maker, and employer, where the discriminator has some 
significant influence that leads to the adverse employment action.”199 The Seventh Circuit held 
that this theory did not apply, because the person who ultimately fired Mr. Staub made the 
decision based on more than just the immediate supervisor.200 The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the “cat’s paw” theory of employer liability applied and that, under it, the employer 
was responsible because it relied on the supervisor’s recommendation, which was motivated by 
anti-military spirit.201  
 
USERRA’s re-employment provisions are designed to ensure the service member returns from 
their duty to their previous employment.202 Importantly, this provision is to ensure the service 
member returns to the position they would have held if they never left.203 The EEOC investigates 
workplace discrimination complaints under several anti-discrimination statutes.204  
 
                                                 
191 See Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price 
for National Defense?, 59 A.F.L. REV. 287, 294 (2007). 
192 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (applying an employment law analysis on the employer liability 
issue in the only USERRA case before the United States Supreme Court.)  
193 Id.   
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 (2011) (“meaning that he sought to hold his employer liable for 
the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision”). 
198 Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., “Cat’s Paw” Theory of Liability, https://www.csklegal.com/news/cats-paw-theory-
of-liability/.   
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 416. 
201 Id. at 423. 
202 BRIAN CLAUSS & STACEY RAE SIMCOX, SERVICEMEMBER AND VETERANS RIGHTS, (Lexis Nexis 2014). 
203 32 C.F.R. § 104.3 (2014); see Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (stating 
that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 “is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left 
private life to serve their country in its hour of great need . . . [B]y these provisions Congress made the restoration as 
nearly a complete substitute for the original job as was possible”). 
204 See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, Laws Enforced by EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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Congress “did not intend to limit the sweep of Section 4302(b) to substantive rights and 
benefits.” 205  Specifically, that subsection supersedes any agreement that imposes additional 
"prerequisites to the exercise of any . . . right or the receipt of any . . . benefit" provided by the 
USERRA.206 Any contract or agreement does just that.207 It mandates that, before “exercising 
her rights under USERRA and obtaining the relief to which she is entitled thereunder, plaintiff 
must participate in an arbitration proceeding.” 208  Nowhere in the USERRA did “Congress 
provide for arbitration as a means to obtain the rights granted in the [USERRA].”209 Instead, 
Congress stated that a “person aggrieved under the [USERRA] can, but need not, seek assistance 
from the Secretary of Labor and the United States Attorney General in resolving the dispute.”210 
In addition to, or as “an alternative to, those avenues of relief, an aggrieved person is authorized 
to bring a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.”211  
 
An arbitration agreement mandates that plaintiff seek relief in an arbitral forum.212 Because that 
type of proceeding was not addressed in the USERRA, it stands as an “additional prerequisite to 
the exercise of plaintiff's rights and the receipt of any benefits to which she might be entitled 
under the act.”213 Hence, the plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) requires that the arbitration 
agreement be superseded by the USERRA.214 
 
In Lopez v. Dillard’s, defendant argued against this conclusion, citing to examples of federal 
employment statutes that “are subject to legitimate arbitration agreements.” 215  However, in 
ruling against the defendant, the court in Lopez stated that it could find “no provisions in those 
acts, nor has the court found any, that make such sweeping statements about superseding any 
laws or agreements that undermine the goals of the enactments216. . . . Indeed, none of these acts  
contain any statement that remotely approaches the sweep of 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b), with its focus 
on not only trampling any state law, contract,  or agreement that diminishes any rights or benefits 
protected by the USERRA, but with the additional emphasis on striking down any ‘prerequisites’ 
to the exercise of those protected rights.”217 
 
                                                 
205 Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005). 
206 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2015). 
207 Lopez, at 1248. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id.; See 38 U.S.C. § 4322, §4323(a) (1991). 
211 Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248; see 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) (1991). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 See e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2016) (discussing the construction of the act with 
state and federal laws); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (2016) (discussing the 
construction of the act with state and federal laws); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2651 
(2016) (discussing the construction of the act with state and federal laws); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
2000h-4 (2016) (discussing construction of the act, including Title VII, with state laws); Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2016) (discussing construction of the act with state and federal laws). 
217 Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D. Kan. 2005). 
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Additional commentary on the legislative intent of USERRA is available in a committee report 
from the House of Representatives’ comments on the interpretation of Section 4302(b). The 
report states that, “Section 4302(b) would reaffirm a general preemption as to state and local 
laws and ordinances, as well as to employer practices and agreements, which provide fewer 
rights or otherwise limit rights provided under amended chapter 43 or put additional conditions 
on those rights.”218 Moreover, this section would reaffirm that “additional resort to mechanisms 
such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar administrative appeals is not 
required.”219  
 
Although the hostile workplace provision is a well-established cause of action under Title VII 
and has recently been applied under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the question 
remains whether it is cognizable under USERRA.220 In Carder v. Continental Airlines,  the Fifth 
Circuit held that USERRA legislation did not provide a cause of action for hostile work 
environment claims based upon an employee’s military service. 227  The Carder Court noted that 
USERRA was passed after both Title VII and the ADA and did not include language suggesting 
that hostile work environment based upon military services was a cause of action.228 Soon after 
the Carder decision, in 2011, Congress passed the bipartisan VOW to Hire Heroes Act, which 
included a provision that amended USERRA to include hostile work environment claims based 
on military status.221 Because USERRA includes anti-discriminatory language, courts may be 
susceptible to automatically reliance upon Title VII's severe or pervasive test.222 Title VII was 
enacted for the purpose of remedying past wrongs and removing barriers experienced by 
historically disadvantaged groups, whereas USERRA was intended to provide protections for the 
purpose of encouraging military recruitment.223 This difference is likely to become even more 
crucial in the current political environment.224 
 
IV. SOLUTION 
 
This section of the article will discuss the negative consequences of violating USERRA. Each 
subsection will address a specific result of USERRA violations and a proposed change to avoid 
it. The broader method to avoid many of these negative implications is to amend USERRA.  
  
                                                 
218 H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 20 (1993). 
219 Id.  
220 Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
247, 251 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
227 Carder v. Cont’l Airlines Inc., 636 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2011), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 112-56, 125 Stat. 
711(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2)).  
228 Id.  
221 H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (2011). 
222 Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
247, 251 (2008) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).  
223 Id.; see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1991). 
224 Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
247, 251 (2008) (citing Robert Burns, Army Likely to Miss Year's Recruiting Goal; It Would Be the First Time Since 
1999, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 9, 2005, at A17). 
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A. Negative Implications of Violating USERRA. 
 
Subsection (i) will discuss how violating USERRA hurts national security. Subsection (ii) will 
discuss how rural service members are especially disadvantaged due to limited access to 
attorneys and the justice system. Lastly, subsection (iii) will discuss the narrow scope of appeal 
ability under the FAA and how this fails USERRA’s purpose.  
 
i. Violating USERRA Hurts National Security. 
 
Due to an increased reliance on the Reserve/National Guard in a post 9/11 world, any violation 
of USERRA ultimately hurts national security.225 Since the end of the 20th and beginning of 
the21st centuries, the National Guard and Reserve have been deployed at record numbers.226 In 
1903, Congress created the modern National Guard when it passed the Militia Act of 1903.The 
modern National Guard serves a unique role, answering to both the state for state-specific 
functions and the federal government when the National Guard is “federalized” under Army 
command.227  
 
During World War I, the National Guard provided the largest number of combat divisions to the 
American Expeditionary Force units stationed in France.228 In World War II, the National Guard 
doubled the size of the regular Army, and National Guard units were the first units to see combat 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor.229 The National Guard has been involved in Korea, Vietnam, the 
first Gulf War, Haiti, and Bosnia.230 Additionally, the National Guard were involved with the 
invasion of Afghanistan and were a large percentage of the forces in Iraq.231  
 
Every branch of the Armed Forces also has a reserve component of part-time soldiers.232 The 
Army Reserve was created in 1908.233 The Navy and Marine Reserves were created after the 
                                                 
225 Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
247, 251 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
226See Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists’ Reemployment Rights, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 797, 801 (2004) (“Today’s Reserve Components . . . are an integral part of the defense strategy and day-to-day 
operations of the U.S. Military.” quoting   Donald Rumsfeld, Sizing and Selectively Modernizing Forces for an Era 
of Uncertainty, SEC’Y OF DEF. ANN REP. 63 (2002)). 
227 Compare 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (activation by the President), with 32 U.S.C. § 907 (2012) (activation by the 
state for state-specific missions). 
228 NAT’L GUARD, About the National Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGu 
ard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx.  
229 See e.g., MICH. DEP’T MIL. & VETERANS AFF., Michigan National Guard in World War II, http://www.michiga 
n.gov/dmva/0,4569,7-126-2360_3003_3009-26798--,00.html. 
230  LAWRENCE KAPP & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS RL30802, RESERVE 
COMPONENT PERSONAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 8 (2014); see NAT’L GUARD, About the National 
Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGu ard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx. 
231 NAT’L GUARD, About the National Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGu 
ard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx. 
232  See Active Duty vs. Reserve or National Guard, VETERANS EMPLOYMENT TOOLKIT HANDOUT, 
https://www.va.gov/vetsinworkplace/docs/em_activeReserve.html.  
233 Id.  
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outbreak of World War I and prior to United States entry into the conflict in 1917.234 The Air 
Force and Air Force Reserve were created after World War II.235 The Coast Guard and Coast 
Guard Reserve became a part of the Department of Homeland Security following 9/11.236 Unlike 
the National Guard, the Reserves do not answer to both the state and the federal government.237 
Reserve units or individual members can be called to active duty.238 
 
Since 9/11, hundreds of thousands of Guard and Reserve members have been activated.239 In 
September 2013, there were 1.1 million Reserve component members.240 National Guard and 
Reserve members are civilians first.241 They are not “full-time soldiers and usually leave civilian 
employment when deployed.” 242  They are being deployed more frequently and for longer 
periods, and these deployments put a strain on their civilian employers while they are gone.243 
As the General Accounting Office Report 02-608 noted, “At every focus group in every unit 
[GAO] visited, some reservists had complaints about their employers. Some said that their 
supervisors were hostile toward their reserve duty and had actively encouraged them to leave the 
reserves.”244  
 
Current National Guard and Reserve component members have been deployed for longer periods 
of time and with less time between deployments than previous members.245 National Guard and 
Reserve component members returning from deployment experience mental health issues at a 
rate more than fifty percent higher than their active duty counterparts.246 The unemployment rate 
for veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan is high, with a large number of those members being Guard 
                                                 
234 Navy Timeline, AMERICA’S NAVY, https://www.navy.com/about/history.html; Marine Corps Reserve History: 
1916-2006, U.S. MARINE CORP., http://www.marforres.marines.mil/USMCR100/History/ (2006). 
235 See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, § 207-08, 61 Stat. 495, 502-03 (1947).  
236 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 888, 116 Stat. 2135 (stating that the Coast Guard is 
considered a military service because the President can transfer Coast Guard assets to the Department of the Navy).  
237  LAWRENCE KAPP & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS RL30802, RESERVE 
COMPONENT PERSONAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 8 (2014); see NAT’L GUARD, About the National 
Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGuard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx. 
238 10 U.S.C. §§ 12303-12304 (2012). 
239 See Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price 
for National Defense?,59 A.F.L. REV. 287, 289 (2007). 
240  LAWRENCE KAPP & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS RL30802, RESERVE 
COMPONENT PERSONAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 4 (2014); see NAT’L GUARD, About the National 
Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGuard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx. 
241 Brain Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment Providing Healthcare to the Citizen Soldier in the National Guard 
and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 917 (2015). 
242 Id.  
243  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 02-608, Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations Between 
Reservists and their Employers (2002) (stating that increased tempo and duration of deployment among reservists is 
4.5 times longer than previously).  
244 Id. at 16.  
245 Sharon M. Erwin, When the Troops Come Home: Returning Reservists, Employers and the Law, HEALTH LAW. 1, 
3 (2007). 
246  Lauren Everitt et al., Efforts Lag to Improve Care for National Guard, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/efforts-lag-to-improve-care-for-national- 
guard/2012/02/04/gIQAymEWER_story.html (discussing Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center statistics). 
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and Reservists.247 Many Guard and Reservists have deployed multiple times since 9/11 only to 
return to find that a recession has eliminated their job. 248 As a country, we depend on the 
National Guard and Reservists as a part of our national security. It follows, then, that as a 
country we should strive to remove as many of these negative qualities that currently flow from 
being a member of the Guard or Reserves.249 
 
ii. Rural Service Members with Limited Access to Attorney’s and Court Systems will also be 
Negatively Affected by this due to Long Commute Times and the Cost Prohibitive Nature. 
 
Rural America is disproportionately represented among National Guard and Reserve 
members.250 Pentagon figures show that more than 44% of military recruits come from rural 
areas, as compared to 14% form major cities.251 Many reasons are offered for the large numbers 
of young people from rural communities who join the military.252 When young people have “few 
options––little chance for employment and no easy route to higher education––they are more 
likely to join the military.”253 A bad economy is good for military recruitment, especially in rural 
communities, where jobs are scarce. 254  These service members particularly rely on their 
employment in the Guard of Reserve.255 They are being deployed “more frequently and for 
longer periods, and these deployments put a strain on their civilian employers while they are 
gone.”256 The official unemployment rates for Reserve component members are unreliable or 
nonexistent, but the lower estimates place the unemployment rate at over twice the national 
average.257 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rate is much higher.258 Veterans returning to 
rural America are likely to find a worse employment situation than veterans returning to urban 
                                                 
247 See Assoc. Press, Unemployment Rate for Young Veterans Hits 21.1 Percent, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/12/AR2010031204123.html.  
248 See Samuel F. Wright & Greg T. Rinckey, Welcome Home, You're Fired, THE FREE LIBRARY, Apr. 1, 2008, 
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/%27Welcome+home%2c+you%27re+fired%27%3a+a+harsh+reality+awaits+many
+returning...-a0178218681 (stating that "Hundreds of thousands of American troops are deployed overseas, and 
when they return home to find their jobs off limits to them, they need diligent, competent counsel."). 
249 Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
247, 277 (2008). 
250 Alexandra Zavis, National Guard Soldiers and Airmen Face Unemployment Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/local/la-me-national-guard-employment-20121124.  
251 See Tim Murphy & Bill Bishop, Largest Share of Army Recruits Come from Rural/Exurban America, DAILY 
YONDER, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.dailyyonder.com/largest-share-army-recruits-come-ruralexurban-
america/2009/03/02/1962.  
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 02-608, Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations Between 
Reservists and their Employers (2002) (stating that increased tempo and duration of deployment among reservists is 
4.5 times longer than previously). 
257  Alexandra Zavis, National Guard Soldiers and Airmen Face Unemployment Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/local/la-me-national-guard-employment-20121124. 
258  See Ted Daywalt, The Real Veteran Unemployment Problem, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 3, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-daywalt/veteran-unemployment_b_3003103.html (stating that the 
unemployment rate of the National Guard was estimated to be twenty-eight percent, and "USERRA … complaints 
skyrocketed" since the 2007 call-up policy change.). 
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America.259 Non-urban Americans earn substantially less than urban workers because of lower 
percentages of high-skill employment opportunities.260  
 
Furthermore, jobs in rural America will not grow at the same rate as in urban America.261 One 
reason is that “rural Americans are not attaining the same level of education as their urban 
counterparts.”262 Although closing the gap in high school completion, the college completion gap 
between urban and rural Americans is increasing. 263 The more highly educated worker will 
generally have higher earnings and a reduced chance of unemployment.264 Not only is this a 
force readiness issue, but it also presents problems if returning veterans need to file a USERRA 
case.265 
 
Rural Americans do not have ready access to attorneys like urban Americans do.266 Nearly “20 
percent of Americans live in rural areas, but the New York Times says just 2 percent of small 
law practices are in those areas.”267 Without an attorney nearby, “rural residents may have to 
drive 100 miles or more to take care of routine matters.”268 For people of limited means, a “long 
drive is a logistical hardship, requiring gas, a day away from work and sometimes an overnight 
stay. And census information shows that rural communities are disproportionately poor.”269 The 
Legal Services Corporation says one legal aid attorney is available for every 6,415 low-income 
Americans, which means that as many as four out of five of those people's civil legal problems 
are not addressed.270 Judge Gail Hagerty of the North Dakota Supreme Court says, "in some 
cases, people just don't get the legal services they need.”271  
 
Pat Goetzinger, the 2011-2012 president of the State Bar of South Dakota, adds that "the strain 
on local budgets as a result of not having local lawyers is astronomical.”272 This because because 
                                                 
259 Brian Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment and Providing Healthcare to Citizen Soldier in the National 
Guard and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 934 (2015). 
260 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE (3d ed. 2013).  
261  See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Employment & Education, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-
population/emp loyment-education.aspx.  
262 Brian Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment and Providing Healthcare to Citizen Soldier in the National 
Guard and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 935 (2015). 
263  See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Employment & Education, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-
population/emp loyment-education.aspx. 
264  See Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2016).  
265 Alexandra Zavis, National Guard Soldiers and Airmen Face Unemployment Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/local/la-me-national-guard-employment-20121124; see also Ted Daywalt, 
The Real Veteran Unemployment Problem, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-
daywalt/veteran-unemployment_b_3003103.html. 
266  Lorelei Laird, In rural America, there are job opportunities and a need for lawyers, ABA J., (2014), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/too_many_lawyers_not_here._in_rural_america_lawyers_are_few_and
far_between.  
267 Id.  
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
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local governments have to pay “judges, prosecutors and private defenders to drive in and handle 
local cases.” 273 Goetzinger's native Bennett County was “forced to do this after its only attorney 
retired, leaving the closest lawyer more than 120 miles away.”274 In Georgia, “six of the state's 
159 counties have no lawyers at all; another 40 have 10 attorneys or fewer.”275 With limited 
financial resources and scarce or non-existent attorneys, it is plain to see how violations of 
USERRA can disproportionately affect rural service members.276  
 
iii. The Standard of Appeal in Arbitration Under the FAA is Extremely Narrow and in 
Contradiction to USERRA’s Purpose. 
  
FAA Section 10(a) provides four limited bases for the modification of the arbitrator’s 
decision.277 Section 10(a) states: 
 
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the 
application of any party to the arbitration— 
(1)  where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;  
(2)  where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or 
either of them;  
(3)  where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or  
(4)  where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
 
These four exceptions were described by the Seventh Circuit, in Eljer Mfg v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 
as “grudgingly narrow.”278 In Eljer, the Seventh Circuit also held that “in addition to the reasons 
set out in the statute, we will set aside an arbitrator's decision if in reaching his result, the 
arbitrator deliberately disregards what he knows to be the law.” 279 This is known as a “manifest 
disregard of the law.”280 Arbitration awards cannot be overturned “merely because the arbitrators 
misunderstood or misapplied the law. Typically, courts hold that the governing law must be 
clearly established and that the arbitrators must be aware of the law, but nonetheless choose to 
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disregard it.”281 However, courts are “quick to add that ‘manifest disregard of law’ as applied to 
review of an arbitral award is a ‘severely limited’ doctrine.” 282  Furthermore, errors in the 
arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact do not merit reversal under this standard.283 
Nor does an insufficiency of evidence supporting the decision permit us to disturb the arbitrator's 
order.284 Arbitration does not provide a system of "junior varsity trial courts" offering the losing 
party complete and rigorous de novo review.285 It is a private system of justice offering benefits 
of reduced delay and expense.286  
 
It is incredibly unlikely that an arbitration award will be reversed, even if the arbitrator does not 
understand or apply USERRA correctly.287 Furthermore, even if the arbitrator does not have 
enough evidence to support their decision against the veteran, it cannot be overturned.288 This 
flies in the face of USERRA’s purposes.289 We cannot expect our veterans to be subject to a 
system that punishes them for serving their country.290 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Zoiber lost his appeal, and the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Zoiber “failed to establish that the 
legislative history evinces Congress's intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement he signed.”291 In failing to uphold Mr. Zoiber’s rights under USERRA, the Ninth 
Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in creating a dangerous precedent for service members.292 In 
Ziober, the Ninth Circuit stated, “We acknowledge the possibility that Congress did not want 
"members of our armed forces to submit to binding, coercive arbitration agreements. "293 That 
intention, however, is not expressed in the statute itself, or in the legislative history. We therefore 
affirm the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing Ziober's complaint.294 The 
concurrence in Zoiber added that it would be imprudent to create a split in the circuit by 
disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, given how Congress can easily remedy this issue.295 The 
concurrence stated that, if “we and other circuits have misinterpreted the scope of § 4302(b), 
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Congress can amend the statute to make clear that it does render pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate USERRA claims unenforceable.”296 
 
Indeed, a proposed amendment 4180 to Senate Bill 2943 would do just that. 297  Proposed 
Amendment 4180 is entitled “Clarifications Regarding Scope of Employment and 
Reemployment Rights of Members of the Uniformed Services.” 298 It reads, in pertinent part: 
 
 (c)(1) Pursuant to this section and the procedural rights afforded by subchapter 
III of this chapter, any agreement to arbitrate a claim under this chapter is 
unenforceable, unless all parties consent to arbitration after a complaint on the 
specific claim has been filed in court or with the Merit Systems Protection Board 
and all parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to have that particular claim 
subjected to arbitration. 
 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, consent shall not be considered voluntary 
when a person is required to agree to arbitrate an action, complaint, or claim 
alleging a violation of this chapter as a condition of future or continued 
employment, advancement in employment, or receipt of any right or benefit of 
employment.299 
 
On December 8, 2016, this bill was passed by both the House of Representatives and 
Congress.300  On 23 December 2016, it was signed into law by President Obama.301 
 
USERRA is of the utmost importance in order to retain service members of the National Guard 
and Reserves.302 Without it, the country will not be able to run its military effectively.303 By 
allowing violations of USERRA to stand, the rights of our service members are being denied and 
our national security is being compromised.304  
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